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INTRODUCTION

June 5, 2013 marked the beginning of an extraordinary, though not
unprecedented, period in the history of the American intelligence
community. Following extensive (and unauthorized) revelations of U.S.
"bulk collection" programs targeting telephone metadata, both the
Executive Branch and Congress have embarked on a more or less
comprehensive review of intelligence activities and the intricate regulatory
structure that is meant to restrain these activities within Constitutional
parameters. In many aspects, the present experience is similar to the
experience in 1974-1978, when aggressive investigative journalism brought
to light the extent to which U.S. intelligence agencies were engaging in
questionable activities, including largely unsupervised domestic
surveillance operations. In the 1970s, these disclosures led to extensive
Congressional investigations, the promulgation of Executive Orders
governing the conduct of all intelligence activities, and the creation of a
statutory framework to govern intelligence surveillance activities

* Michael J. Woods is a Vice President & Associate General Counsel of Verizon
Communications Inc. He previously served as Counsel in the National Security
Division in the U.S. Department of Justice; as Chief of the FBI's National Security
Law Unit; and as Principal Legal Advisor at the National Counterintelligence
Executive. The views expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not
reflect the official policy or position of Verizon or any U.S. government component.
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conducted within the United States.
The present instance of this reflective process, however, also introduces
some significant new themes. In the 1970s, the clear impulse in response to
the revealed abuses was to directly regulate government activity.' Though
the intelligence reforms of the mid-1970s occurred when the reputations of
Executive Branch institutions were at a historically low ebb, there appeared
to be a consensus that those government institutions, fitted out with proper
oversight, could safely conduct intelligence activities. In the post-Snowden
reform discussions, this consensus is much less in evidence. It may be that
the perceived inadequacies of the 1970s-era oversight structure in the face
of post 9/11 pressures fatally undermined the belief that some combination
of regulatory, judicial, and Congressional oversight can be sufficient to
control intelligence agencies. In any case, reform discussions now include
the consistent theme that the collection, searching, and perhaps even
analysis of potentially relevant data is best done by the private holders of
that data not the government.
My intention here is to briefly examine whether private entities should
ever serve as government surrogates in the collection or analysis of data.
Mindful of the limitations of writing while this topic is in "middiscussion," I will first examine the current proposals, and the assumptions
underlying those proposals. Then, I will explore some of the issues that, in
my view, militate against the surrogacy and note trends in communications
technology that ought to be addressed in any reform discussions.
THE PRESIDENT'S DATA RETENTION PROPOSAL
Within weeks of the first Snowden disclosures, President Obama
commissioned a special review group to examine the issues surrounding
"bulk collection" of data and to make policy recommendations to him. 2
Shortly thereafter, Congress requested that the pre-existing Privacy and
Civil Liberties Oversight Board ("PCLOB") conduct an inquiry into the
newly disclosed surveillance activities.3 Both bodies consulted widely with
I.

1.

For a thorough description of the reform process, see DAVID S. KRIS & J.

DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL

SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS at

Chapter 2 (regulation of intelligence activities) and Chapter 3 (regulation of
intelligence surveillance and searches, specifically). (2d ed. 2012).
2.
See Memorandum Reviewing Our Global Signals Intelligence Collection and
Communications Technologies, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 567 (Aug. 12, 2013)
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201300567/pdf/DCPD-20130056
7.pdf.
3.
For the initial Congressional request, see Letter from Tom Udall et al., U.S.
Senators, to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (June 12, 2013), available
http://www.pclob.gov/Library/Letter-SenatelettertoPCLOB-Jun2O13.pdf.
at
Additional members of Congress joined the request in subsequent days.
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intelligence agencies, outside interest groups, academics, policymakers,
and representatives of industry.
The Presidential review group, known formally as the Review Group on
Intelligence and Communications Technologies, released its report on
December 12, 2013.4 The report contained numerous recommendations,
but one that garnered particular attention was that bulk collection of
telephony metadata might be replaced by a "system in which such metadata
is held instead either by private providers or by a private third party."
Less than a month later, on January 14, 2014, President Obama announced
his proposals to reform U.S. intelligence collection operations.6 He issued
a Presidential Decision Directive that made changes to the operational rules
affecting intelligence collection.7 He then announced, conditionally, the
end of bulk collection of telephony metadata pursuant to Section 215 of the
USA PATRIOT Act and appeared to endorse (though noted certain
difficulties) the Review Group's recommendation on non-government
entities holding the metadata. 8
The condition was important: his
Administration, together with Congress, would work to come up with a
solution that enabled the intelligence community to obtain the information
it requires while leaving the metadata in the hands of the telephone
companies. 9 The bulk collection program was to continue until the solution,
which had an original due date of March 28, 2014, was fully in place.10
The March 28 deadline passed, and the Administration announced that the

4.

See THE PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC'Ns TECHS.,
AND
SECURITY IN A CHANGING
WORLD
(2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg-final-report.pdf.
5.
Id. at 25 (focusing on Recommendation number five).
6.
Remarks on United States Signals Intelligence and Electronic Surveillance
Programs, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 30 (Jan. 17, 2014), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201400030/pdf/DCPD-201400030.pdf.
7.
Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Sec'y, Presidential Policy
Directive - Signals Intelligence Activities (Jan. 17, 2014), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidential-policy-directivesignals-intelligence-activities.
8.
The collection in bulk of telephone metadata had been authorized under the
"business records" section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
("FISA"), which is codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861. This application of section 1861 was
enabled by the expansion of the business records authority by section 215 of the USA
PATRIOT Act. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). For this reason, the FISA business
records provision is commonly known as "Section 215."
9.
See Remarks on United States Signals Intelligence and Electronic Surveillance
Programs, supra note 6, at 7.
10. Id.
LIBERTY
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bulk collection program would continue until the solution was enacted."
The PCLOB issued an extensive report on January 23, 2014, and, though
consultation with the PCLOB was noted in the President's statement, it
does not appear that the PCLOB findings were as closely linked to the
Administration's policy as those of the Review Group.12
As of October 2014, the Administration has yet to release a detailed
proposal for "solving" the bulk collection problem or any particular details
regarding how the "data retention by provider" concept might be
implemented. The implementation details are important, since there is no
guarantee that the telephone companies will retain, or continue to maintain,
metadata for a long enough period of time to satisfy the needs of the
intelligence community. In the present system of bulk collection (at least
as it has become publicly known) the government compels the major
telephone carriers to turn over "call detail records" in bulk, perhaps on a
daily basis.1 3 The intelligence community then retains these records for a
period of five years, and queries them as needed.1 4 If this system
transitions to one in which the telephone companies did not hand over
records in bulk to the government, but rather, executed individualized
queries against the stock of records that the company holds in the ordinary
course of business, then the length of time that the company holds its own
records becomes particularly relevant. 15 If, for example, the intelligence
agency requires that records be searched five years into the past and the
telephone companies only retain such records for twelve months, then
11.

See Presidential Statement on the National Security Agency's Section 215

Bulk Telephony Metadata Program, 2014 DAILY COMP. PREs. Doc. 213 (Mar. 27,
2014), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201400213/pdf/DCPD201400213.pdf (commenting that data "should remain at the telephone companies for
the length of time that it currently does today.").
12.
PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE
RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND
ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 168 (2014),

available at http://www.pclob.gov/library/215-Report - on theTelephone-Records
Program.pdf. Interestingly, the PCLOB explicitly rejected the idea of data retention by
providers.
13.
Declassified versions of the "primary order" issued by the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court ("FISC") indicate that two companies are compelled to produce
records. See Primary Order, BR-14-01 (FISC January 3, 2014) at 3-4. Redacted
version of order available at, http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/BR%
2014-02%200rder-2.pdf.
14. See PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., supra note 12, at 21-37.
15. See, e.g., United and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ending
Eavesdropping, Dragnet-collection and Online Monitoring Act: ("USA FREEDOM
Act"): Hearing on H.R. 3361 Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 113th Cong.

(2014) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Chairman, S. Select Comm. on
Intelligence), available at, http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?I D=a6cbcb99-b I 9d-41 a4-be93-ae4b9841 Odab.
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either the agency will have to forego the ability to search beyond twelve
months or the company will have to be compelled to retain its records for a
longer period of time.
This reasoning assumes, of course, that the
intelligence agencies actually need access to historical records, and this is
far from a settled question. Many, most notably the PCLOB, have
questioned the examples cited as justification for the bulk telephony
program.16 The amount of time that metadata retains a demonstrable
intelligence value appears to be a "soft" number at present, but there will
need to be a consensus value for any solution to proceed.
The intelligence value question opens a very complex debate, even when
that debate is restricted to just traditional telephony. Telephone companies
retain call detail records as "business records," that is, records that are
generated in the ordinary course of business and are retained for as long as
needed in the conduct of the company's business.17 The business need for
call detail records has evolved over time. In the past, they were an
essential component of the telephone billing systems relevant to most
customers.
As the billing function has transitioned, CDRs remain
important for other business functions like traffic management and load
balancing in the telephone networks, calculation of inter-company
transactions between telephone providers, and fraud investigations.
However, the retention periods associated with each of these functions may
vary from one company to the next, and even between components of a
single company (i.e. wireless networks vs. landline networks; international
vs. domestic).18
How the President's proposal will craft a workable solution is likely to
depend heavily on Congress. The current FISA statute contains no explicit
provision at all for data retention, and thus, it is unlikely that the creation of
such requirements is within the existing authority of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC"). The solution, therefore, will
certainly require legislative action. There is no shortage of legislative
proposals, but none so far have addressed the specific challenge of data
retention. In general, the legislative proposals fall into three categories: (1)

16. See PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., supra note 12, at 145-155.
17. Some have suggested that the Federal Communications Commission
regulations require telephone companies to retain call detail records for eighteen
months. See 47 C.F.R. § 42.6 (2000). In fact, the FCC requirement is to retain certain
customer billing records-which increasingly do not incorporate call detail records at
all.
18.
A generic description of these business uses is often included in the privacy
policy statements of telephone companies.
Compare Privacy Policy Summary,
VERIZON WIRELESS, https://www.verizon.com/about/privacy/ (last updated Nov. 2013)
with AT&T Privacy Policy, AT&T, http://www.att.com/gen/privacy-policy?pid=2506
(last visited Feb. 22, 2014).
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those that focus on enhanced oversight of intelligence agency activity
without substantially altering Section 215;19 (2) those that simply abolish
the ability to conduct bulk collection pursuant to Section 215;20 and (3)
those that abolish bulk collection, but provide a targeted alternative means
for the intelligence community to obtain data from private entities.2 1
Whether any of these develop into an option that meets the twin goals of
the stated Administration policy (meeting intelligence needs but providers
retaining the data), or whether the Administration's view prevails at all
remains unknown. As the discussion intensifies, the data retention question
likely will come back into focus, and the possibility of requiring companies
to retain, or even analyze, data on the government's behalf will need
serious examination.
II.

TELEPHONE PROVIDERS AS GOVERNMENT SURROGATES

Lacking a specific proposal to critique, the next stage of my inquiry is to
broadly examine the issues in a proposal that would require telephone
companies to retain call detail records (or equivalent telephony metadata)
for a period defined without reference to the use of those records in
ordinary business. The companies would then be required to produce
records in response to targeted queries authorized by the FISC Those
queries could require the simple delivery of information, and might also
require the provision of information prospectively or the production of
records found to be associated with the queried numbers. Thus, the
notional solution would require the telephone company both to retain data,
and to produce the data in a specified format (perhaps entailing some
rudimentary analysis of the data on the part of the company).
The foundational question here is whether or not such a data retention
scheme better serves to protect Constitutional interests. There is a lively
debate in the courts as to the Constitutional significance of the telephony
metadata at issue in the bulk collection program. 2 2 Although difficult to

19. See, e.g., FISA Improvements Act of 2013, S. 1631, 113th Cong. (as reported
by S. Comm. on Intelligence, Oct. 31, 2013) (enhances oversight and reporting
requirements but retains ability to conduct bulk collection under Section 215).
20. See, e.g., USA FREEDOM Act, H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. (as passed by House,
May 22, 2014) (explicitly revokes the authority for bulk collection).
21. See, e.g., FISA Transparency and Modernization Act, H.R. 4291, 113th Cong.
(as referred to Comm., Mar. 25, 2014) (revokes authority for bulk collection but creates
new mechanism for expanded queries of telephone metadata). A similar approach is
taken in a new Senate version of the USA FREEDOM Act introduced in the summer of
2014 by Sen. Leahy. See USA FREEDOM Act of 2014, S. 2685, 113th Cong (as voted
against on a cloture motion to proceed on Nov. 11, 2014).
22. See Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 41 (D.D.C. 2013); Am. Civil
Liberties Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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*

predict, it seems the courts may be evolving toward a more nuanced
approach than that taken in United States v. Miller23 and Smith v.
Maryland.24 The ease with which metadata can now be aggregated and
analyzed, along with the steady enhancement of the metadata itself, seems
to be chipping away at the traditional precedent that transactional data in
the hands of third parties does not have any Constitutional protection. If
the data has some greater or lesser degree of Constitutional significance,
then the examination of that data by the government is an especially
sensitive operation.
If that is the case, why would whatever
Constitutionally protected interests exist be more secure if the operation
were outsourced to private corporations? I think the answer lies in the
belief that, because the Constitution principally protects individuals from
government activity, keeping more data out of the hands of the government
effects a de facto enhancement of personal liberty.
This belief, however, does not take into account the effect that the data
retention mandate has on the very nature of the private entity.
Telecommunications companies are in the business of moving data in
forms such as voice, video, text, and internet traffic efficiently from one
point to another.
As discussed above, metadata generated by the
communications process is held only if, and only for as long as, there is a
25*
business purpose in doing so.
Outside of limited internal business
operations like fraud detection and cybersecurity, there typically is no need
for companies to retain metadata for extended periods of time.26 If the
company is required to retain data for the use of intelligence agencies, it is
no longer acting pursuant to a business purpose. Rather, it is serving the
government's purpose; the company has become an agent or surrogate of
the government in this context. The Constitutional benefit of having the
data held by private entities is lost when, by the very act of compelling
retention of that data for non-business purposes, the private entity becomes
a functional surrogate of the government. Put another way, people initially
may be comforted by the thought of their data remaining in the bands of
telephone companies, but only to the extent that they believe the companies
are truly independent of the government. When the companies are seen as
23.
425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (finding no Fourth Amendment protections for
business records created through voluntary interactions with third parties).
24.
442 U.S. 735, 743-46 (1979) (applied Miller to find no Fourth Amendment
protection for telephone call detail records).
25.
Telephone providers typically note this principle in their user agreements or
privacy policies. See, e.g., Verizon Privacy Policy Summary & AT&T Privacy Policy
supra note 18.
26.
Telecom companies are allowed to access statutorily protected information for
"rights and property" protection and for functions incidental to the delivery of the
service. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2072(b)(2), (5), 2511(2)(a)(i) (2012).
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surrogates for or with the intelligence agencies, surely that comfort will
dissipate.
The use of surrogates is not unfamiliar territory for the government. In
fact, the government performs many of its functions through the vast
infrastructure of federal contracting. Federal acquisition principles, which
govern how federal agencies purchase goods or services from contractors,
have always recognized that there are some functions so inherently
Inherently
governmental that they should never be outsourced.27
governmental functions include activity "significantly affecting the life,
liberty, or property of private persons" 28 and specifically include the
"direction
and control
of intelligence
and counter-intelligence
operations." 29 Some aspects of the data retention concept may approach, if
not exceed, this limit. While one might argue that the government still
retains the "direction and control" of the collection operation, it is also true
that the day-to-day decisions of how to retain the data, and what
specifically to retain, will occur beyond the government's view, in very
large and complex technical environments that are imperfectly understood
outside the circle of those that actually operate them. The government may
well have to rely on the companies' understanding and implementation of
the retention requirements in the rapidly evolving and often proprietary
environments that the companies control. This concern becomes more
acute when the companies are also required to perform some form of
analysis on the data before handing it to the government.
The current proposal is hardly the first time that the government has
pushed the envelope on the "inherently governmental function" limit. The
use of security contractors to perform quasi-military functions during the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan raised concerns about whether the
government could maintain sufficient "direction and control" to ensure the
proper behavior of its surrogates. 30 The investigations prompted by the
often unsatisfactory and occasionally tragic results of that endeavor
revealed the inherent difficulties in establishing effective oversight within a

27. See Memorandum from the Office of the Press Sec'y on Government
Contracting to the Heads of Exec. Dep'ts and Agencies (March 4, 2009) available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the press-office/Memorandum-for-the-Heads-ofExecutive-Departments-and-Agencies-Subject-Government/.
28.
See CircularNo. A-76 Revised: Performanceof Commercial Activities, OFFICE
OF MGMT. & BUDGET (May 29, 2003) at Attachment A, Section B(l)(a)(3), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars a076_a76_incltech-correction/.
29. See 48 C.F.R. § 7.503(c)(8) (2010).
30.
See, e.g., James Risen, Before Shooting in Iraq, a Warning on Blackwater,
N.Y.
TIMES,
at
Al,
June
29,
2014,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/30/us/before-shooting-in-iraq-warning-onblackwater.html?_r-0.
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private entity.31 It is noteworthy that the private security entities involved
eagerly sought this role (as a surrogate) and were businesses constructed
entirely for the purpose of providing these kinds of services to the
government. By contrast, telecommunications providers are likely to resist
any suggestion of data retention requirements, and operate businesses
substantially unfocused on the collection of intelligence. The government's
history with military contractors suggests that the benefits of outsourcing a
difficult function can be lost
Effective oversight would be absolutely critical to any potential
outsourcing of intelligence collection or analysis to private entities. One of
the legacies of intelligence reform in the 1970s was a multi-layered
oversight system designed to bring external review of intelligence agency
activities while not compromising security. In the Executive Branch,
oversight took the form of the President's Intelligence Oversight Board,
which oversees the regulation of intelligence activities under Executive
Order 12,333 and the various agency-specific implementations of that
order. 3 2 Inspectors General within the Executive Branch are also involved
in the oversight of intelligence activities, as is the PCLOB.33 Intelligence
agencies are subject to Congressional oversight, most directly through the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select
Congress has imposed myriad reporting
Committee on Intelligence.
requirements in the National Security Act, the FISA and many of the
periodic Intelligence Authorization Acts. 34 Finally, the Courts exercise
supervision of surveillance activities within the United States (and those
targeting U.S. persons outside the United States) pursuant to FISA. As
recently declassified opinions have confirmed, the FISC not only
scrutinizes applications for surveillance authority but also is significantly
involved in the "minimization" process applied to the collected
information.3 5

31. See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., R40991, PRIVATE SECURITY
CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: LEGAL ISSUES (2010) at 1-2 available at
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R4099 1.pdf.
32. See Exec. Order 12,333, 3 C.F.R. § 200 (1981), reprinted as amended in 50
U.S.C. § 401 app. at 16-30 (2012).
33. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. §§ 403q (CIA Inspector General), 3033(3)-(5)(A),
(Inspector General of the Intelligence Community), 3602 (NSA Director of
Compliance) (2012); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee(c)-(d) (2006 & Supp. V 2012)
(PCLOB enabling statute).
34. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1808, 1826, 1846, 1862, 1871(a), 1881f (2012)
(Congressional reporting requirements for various FISA operational authorities).
35. See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion, In re Application of the Federal Government
for an Order Requiring Production of Tangible Things from [Redacted], [Redacted], at
79-81 (FISA Ct., Oct. 3, 2011) [hereinafter Memorandum Opinion], available at
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/162016974-FISA-court-
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Aside from the possible involvement of the FISC, none of these
oversight mechanisms relate to private entities. All of the government
facing oversight mechanisms derived from the Fourth Amendment
restraints on government action 3 6 Oversight mechanisms in the private
sector do not share that pedigree. Private companies conduct internal
oversight to ensure that their employees comply with company policy;
company policy, in turn, requires compliance with all relevant fiduciary,
statutory, regulatory, and contractual requirements.37 As in the case of data
retention practices, corporate policy and oversight mechanisms are
specifically tailored to the business. In telecommunications companies,
customer privacy is the subject of oversight-but that oversight arises
mostly from a contractual obligation. The common practice in the industry
is to publish a privacy policy that explains what information the company
collects, how it will use the information, and with whom it will share the
information.38 These policies may implement regulatory requirements, but
also may exceed the protections required by regulation.
Corporate
oversight focuses on putting safeguards in place to implement the privacy
policies, detecting violations of the privacy policy, assessing the need to
issue notices or seek customer consent, and remediating improper
disclosures of private data.
So, if data retention and analytical requirements make some telecom
employees surrogates for government intelligence agencies, will existing
oversight mechanisms be sufficient? I think that the answer is clearly no.
Without substantial changes, the government facing mechanisms cannot be
brought to bear on the telecom employees.
Similarly, the in-house
oversight structures do not contemplate governmental activity occurring
within the private company. In order to establish the requisite direction and
control, every company that is compelled to enter this new relationship
with the intelligence agency will have to construct appropriate oversight
mechanisms. To achieve uniform protection, these new mechanisms would
have to be consistent in each company.
Who would enforce such
opinion-with-exemptions.pdf; Primary Order, In re Application from the Federal
Government for an Order Requiring that Production of Tangible Things from
[Redacted], BR 08-13, at 17-20 (FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 2009) [hereinafter Primary Order],
available at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pubMarch%202%20200
9%200rder/o20from%20FISC.pdf.
36.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
37. See,
e.g.,
Verizon
Code of Conduct, VERIZON,
available at
http://www.veizon.com/about/sites/default/files/Verizon-Code-of-Conduct.pdf
Verizon's code details requirements for employees to comply with various legal
obligations and describes internal enforcement of the same. For example, the Code
requires the customer information. See id. at sec. 4.1.1.
38. See Verizon Privacy Policy Summary, supra note 18; AT&T Privacy Policy,
supra note 18.
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consistency and monitor the operation of these new structures? Most likely
those tasks would fall to the same institutions that now oversee government
activities (Congress, the courts, and Executive Branch agencies). In light
of recent events, all of these institutions have been criticized for failing to
question the development of the bulk collection program, and their critics
portray them as sclerotic and self-referential. If any of this criticism is
valid, then these institutions need substantial refurbishment before they can
take on the creation of a new layer of oversight within private companies.
But if such rejuvenation is possible, then wouldn't it be more efficient to
bring enhanced oversight to bear in the government space, and leave the
current collection paradigm intact?
The proposed outsourcing certainly does not offer any promise of
efficiency. Under current conditions, the government would have to
oversee the construction of collection and oversight mechanisms in several
telecommunications companies just to maintain access to the stores of
telephony metadata that appears to have been involved in the bulk
collection program. Current conditions, however, are never persistent in
technology. Already, telecommunications networks are evolving beyond
traditional switched telephony. Voice over Internet Protocol ("VoIP")
technologies handle voice traffic over the Internet (as opposed to the
telephony networks) and already account for a substantial portion of voice
traffic. 3 9 Even more dramatic has been the rise of "over the top" ("OTT")
applications that use peer to peer or other technologies to establish direct
connections between users over the Internet. In 2012, one such application
(Skype) accounted for 34% of all international voice calling minutes (more
than any other single provider).4 0 VoIP and over the top applications may
traverse IP networks operated by a large telecommunications company
(most of which are also Tier 1 Internet Service Providers), but they do so as
Internet traffic (not telephony) and thus the equivalent of call detail records
reside with the VoIP or OTT provider, and not with the
telecommunications company (which is simply the conduit for the IP
traffic).4 1 If the U.S. intelligence agencies were to commit to the outsourced

39.

For a simplified technical explanation of VolP, see Understanding VoIP,

PACKETIZER, http://www.packetizer.com/ipmc/papers/understanding-voip/.

40. Phil Goldstein, Report: Skype Makes Up One-Third of All InternationalPhone
Traffic, FIERCE WIRELESS (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/reportskype-makes-one-third-all-international-phone-traffic/2013-02-15 (providing statistics
for VolP and Skype).
41. For example, a company like Verizon might carry a Skype call, but that call
would simply be in the form of individual packets traversing Verizon's network. Only
the provider (Skype) would re-assemble those packets on either end of the
communication and thus know the identity of the user on either end of the call. See
Goldstein, supra note 40.
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solution to obtain telephony metadata, they would need to approach each
successive VolP or OTT application owner to establish access equivalent to
the CDRs they obtain under the existing program.
The technical
difficulties multiply if the intelligence agencies were to eventually seek the
same sort of access to IP metadata from Internet Service Providers.
Finally, the commercial effect on U.S. companies of outsourcing
collection ought to be considered. No telecommunications company will
be eager to undertake the increased responsibility, scrutiny, and liability
entailed by having its employees become surrogates for the government in
the collection of intelligence. More troubling for large U.S. telephone
companies (all of which have extensive operations outside of the U.S.) is
the effect in the international market of overt association with a U.S.
intelligence agency. 4 2
There is a negative effect even when that
relationship is compelled. The effect of an ongoing and official surrogacy
relationship would doubtless be far more lasting and substantial. U.S.
companies would become routinely subject to the same suspicions that,
prior to the Snowden disclosure, some in the U.S. government had leveled
at certain foreign corporations.4 3
CONCLUSION

All of the foregoing reasons, in my view, argue for maintaining the
current structure under which intelligence agencies retain and analyze data

that has been obtained from telecommunications companies in an "arm's
length" transaction compelled by a FISA order. I think the proposal to
outsource this work to surrogates in the private sector is a futile attempt to
sidestep the difficult work that needs to be done to restore public
confidence in intelligence agencies. I think that the best path forward is to
focus on the repair and enhancement of existing oversight mechanisms, as
well as on adjustments to the scope of FISA authorities. This last point
alone will require a careful re-balancing of privacy and security interestsa process that took several years when it last occurred in the 1970s.4 The
42. See Eamon Javers, Is a Snowden Effect Stalking U.S. Telecom Sales?, CNBC
(Nov. 15, 2013, 12:16 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101202361; see also, Anton
Troianoski & Danny Yadron, German Government Ends Verizon Contract, WALL ST.
J. (June 26, 2014 2:54 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/german-government-endsverizon-contract-1403802226.
43. See, e.g., MIKE RODGERS & DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVE PERMANENT SELECT COMM.
REPORT
ON
U.S.
NATIONAL
SECURITY

ON INTELLIGENCE,
ISSUES
POSED

INVESTIGATIVE
BY
CHINESE

COMPANIES HUAWEI AND ZTE (2012), available at
https://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/HuaweiZTE%20Investigative%20Report%20%28FINAL%29.pdf.
44. The reform period in Congress ran from the establishment of the Church
Committee on January 27, 1975 through the passage of FISA in 1978. See KRIS
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adjustments to intelligence authorities made in the immediate aftermath of
9/11 should not persist or vanish 4 5 by default simply because we cannot
bring ourselves to undertake deliberate reform.

In the Executive
Branch, active reform continued until the issuance of Executive Order 12,333 in 1981.
See id. At Chapter 2, sec. 2.7.
45. Under current law, Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act sunsets on June 1,
2015. See USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-177, § 102(b), 120 Stat. 192 (2006).
WILsoN, supra note I at Chapter 2, sec. 2.3, Chapter 3, see. 3.7.

